Incumbency, trust and the Monsanto effect: stakeholder discourses on greenhouse gas removal by Cox, Emily et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/125739/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Cox, Emily, Spence, Elspeth and Pidgeon, Nick 2019. Incumbency, trust and the Monsanto effect:
stakeholder discourses on greenhouse gas removal. Environmental Values file 
Publishers page: 
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
INCUMBENCY, TRUST AND THE MONSANTO EFFECT: STAKEHOLDER DISCOURSES ON 
GREENHOUSE GAS REMOVAL 
 
Emily Cox (Corresponding Author) 
Understanding Risk Group, Department of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, CF10 3AT, UK 
Leverhulme Centre for Climate Change Mitigation, Sheffield University 
CoxE3@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Elspeth Spence 
Understanding Risk Group, Cardiff University 
Leverhulme Centre for Climate Change Mitigation, Sheffield University 
SpenceE@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
and  
 
Nick Pidgeon 
Understanding Risk Group, Cardiff University 
Leverhulme Centre for Climate Change Mitigation, Sheffield University 
PidgeonN@cardiff.ac.uk  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores factors shaping perceptions of Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR) amongst a range 
of informed stakeholders, with a particular focus on their role in future social and political systems. 
We find considerable ambivalence regarding the role of climate targets and incumbent interests in 
relation to GGR. Our results suggest that GGR is symbolic of a fundamental debate – occurring not 
only between separate people, but sometimes within the minds of individuals themselves – over 
whether technological solutions represent a pragmatic or an unethical strategy. We present the idea of 
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a ‘Monsanto effect’, whereby an entirely separate debate taps into deeper narratives and becomes so 
pervasive that it spills over into a new topic area. Our findings have significant implications for 
extant and emergent climate policy as they suggest that, in addition to the considerable practical 
challenges facing large-scale GGR deployment, there is a deeper psychological challenge in that 
actors are themselves conflicted about the fundamental desirability of GGR. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR) has risen rapidly up the academic and policy agenda in 
recent years. It has increasingly been suggested that, in order to meet ambitious global climate 
change targets, there is a need not only to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) but to 
actually remove previously emitted GHGs from the atmosphere in order to compensate for difficult-
to-decarbonise sectors such as heavy industry and aviation (EASAC 2018). This question has become 
even more pressing since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, Article 2 of which states the 
aim to pursue efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
(United Nations 2015). The majority of Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) scenarios used by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) require GGRs at a significant scale to meet even 
a two degrees Celsius (°C) target – a fact that was only recently brought to the fore via increased 
scrutiny of modelling assumptions following the Paris Agreement (Anderson and Peters 2016). Since 
then, a diverse range of GGR approaches have been proposed; some of the major ones under 
consideration are explained in Table 1 (below).  
Much existing social science research addresses the topics of ‘geoengineering’, defined as ‘the 
deliberate, large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment in order to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change’ (Royal Society 2009, 1). This field generally distinguishes between 
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) measures, which would alter the Earth’s albedo, and GGR 
measures that aim to remove GHGs from the atmosphere. Most of the research on geoengineering to 
date focuses on SRM (Cummings et al. 2017), but there is a fast-growing body of technical work on 
GGR as well as several papers questioning the assumptions of large-scale GGR in many policy-
relevant climate models (see Anderson and Peters 2016; Larkin et al. 2017; Vaughan and Gough 
2016).  
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Research has also identified multiple ethical concerns associated with GGR, which means that 
deploying it at scale to meet emissions targets is not a foregone conclusion (Cox et al. 2018). 
Christopher Preston (2013) reviews thirteen topics of ethical concern relating to GGR and SRM that 
emerge within four temporal spaces (pre-research, research and development, implementation and 
post-implementation), focusing particularly on the ‘moral permissibility’ of intentionally altering the 
climate. A number of papers discuss various other ethical issues, including: concerns about the 
justice implications of GGR for vulnerable populations, low-emitting countries and future 
generations (Hansen et al. 2017; Lawford-Smith and Currie 2017); concerns about democracy and 
plurality in decision-making (McLaren 2016; Porter and Hulme 2013); and concerns that GGR might 
reduce support for ambitious emissions reductions (Campbell-Arvai et al. 2017; Markusson et al. 
2018). Sam Adelman (2017) argues that, although it is important to distinguish between GGR and 
SRM, both are risky in terms of the ethics of human rights, for reasons of scientific hubris, cessation 
concerns and technological ‘fetishism’ (i.e. the mistaken belief that technology is the answer to all 
problems). Yet Preston (2015) suggests that GGR is less ethically problematic that SRM because it is 
‘restorative’ as opposed to ‘additive’: it reduces anthropogenic forcing to levels more consistent with 
an earlier time. Similarly, much of the scientific literature argues that GGR (unlike SRM) treats the 
root cause of the problem rather than the ‘symptoms’ (Minx et al. 2018). Nevertheless, this 
characterisation of GGR has been shown to be dependent on whether the ‘cause’ of climate change is 
defined as the greenhouse gases themselves, or the irresponsible burning of fossil fuels (Cox et al. 
2018). 
 
1.1 Stakeholder discourses on geoengineering, GGR and climate change 
Many aspects of climate change are characterised by deep, often irreducible uncertainty. This has led 
to a growing use of ‘expert elicitation’ methods, which seek to gather the informed opinions of expert 
stakeholders operating in specific domains, in order to develop systematic knowledge about problems 
that involve significant uncertainty (Rai 2013). Such methods have been used extensively in 
quantitative decision-making processes, including interrogating the role of GGRs in climate models 
(Vaughan and Gough 2016). Since expert stakeholders are increasingly called upon to inform such 
decision-making processes, it is important to understand their perspectives and discourses, especially 
in instances of high uncertainty or novelty (Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007). Importantly, expert 
perceptions are informed by values and beliefs as well as by scientific information and analysis: 
topics such as climate change are understood in diverse ways, meaning that ‘knowledge’ (even that 
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of the most eminent experts) depends on numerous contextual factors, including individuals’ values 
and belief structures (Hulme 2009). One advantage of expert elicitation is that it can help to 
understand the complex underlying factors and discourses that currently shape stakeholders’ 
perceptions, thus illuminating some of the knowledge forms and subjectivities that may feed into 
decision-making processes.  
There is an existing body of scholarly work on stakeholder discourses in the context of 
geoengineering. This tends to fall into two analytical categories: examinations of discourses in the 
public sphere (for instance, in print media or policy documents), and face-to-face studies using 
workshops, interviews or online methods. Within the former, Brigitte Nerlich and Rusi Jaspal (2012) 
conduct a metaphor analysis of framings of geoengineering in news and magazine articles from 1985 
to 2010, finding three overarching metaphors: ‘the planet is a body’, ‘the planet is a machine’ and 
‘the planet is a patient/addict’. Similarly, Kate Porter and Mike Hulme (2013) argue that print media 
anthropomorphises the earth when discussing geoengineering, particularly seeing as it does not 
generally distinguish between SRM and GGR. Jonas Anshelm and Anders Hansson (2014) also 
analyse media discourses on geoengineering, comparing an ‘advocacy’ discourse to a ‘critical’ one 
and finding a fundamental dissensus between the two; notably, they argue that this relates to the 
different ways in which the discourses present views on social change, knowledge and humanity’s 
ability (or lack thereof) to control or manipulate nature. Finally, Duncan McLaren (2016) undertakes 
a secondary analysis of a corpus of media content studies (including those mentioned above), finding 
three explicit ‘master framings’ – technological optimism, political realism and catastrophe 
avoidance. Interestingly, McLaren also finds that justice is notable by virtue of its absence in these 
framings, with related concepts such as equity, fairness and distribution receiving barely any 
mentions. As such, he argues that geoengineering media discourse has deliberately ‘framed out’ 
justice, particularly in the ways in which geoengineering is positioned as ‘essential’ in the face of 
unmitigated climate change. 
A related but separate body of work elicits stakeholder opinions on geoengineering using 
face-to-face methods. Reviewing the existing research on stakeholder discourses with the goal of 
illuminating factors that may influence public attitudes, Adam Corner et al. (2012) found a wide 
range of overlapping and conflicting views within a rather limited literature. Part of the aim of the 
present paper is to explore the reasons why these views might be overlapping and conflicting. In a Q-
methodology study on geoengineering, Rose Cairns and Andy Stirling (2014) found four dominant 
framings and an apparent polarisation of the discussion. However, within the alternative framings 
proposed, they found that a more nuanced picture emerged, with the ambiguity of the term 
‘geoengineering’ being used to provide flexibility for diverse interests. Meanwhile, Rob Bellamy et 
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al. (2013) conducted a large multi-criteria mapping study wherein experts (and publics, in a parallel 
series of workshops) drew up set of criteria by which to judge geoengineering proposals, comparing a 
number of specific geoengineering options with alternative mitigation options. Accordingly, the 
authors suggested ‘opening up’ the discussion to a wider range of criteria and perspectives – an aim 
that is purposefully reflected in our methodology (see section 2). Finally, in one of the only existing 
studies on a specific GGR technique, Kate Gannon and Mike Hulme (2018) use Q-methodology to 
study communities affected by a highly controversial ocean fertilisation project. Their findings 
suggest that perspectives were strongly geographically rooted, yet also connected to wider cultural 
meanings and discourses regarding human values of and responsibilities toward nature, 
demonstrating that participants discourses ‘reflect the contested philosophical underpinnings of wider 
environmental management and restoration debates’ (ibid., 14). It is worth pointing out the 
particularities of ocean fertilisation as a GGR, however, since deployment takes place in open oceans 
and therefore, unlike most GGRs, its effects are territorially unbounded. Nevertheless, these polarised 
discourses around mankind’s relationship with the natural world may still be relevant for thinking 
about more spatially constrained GGRs in future.  
Much of the previous research on stakeholder discourses examines ‘geoengineering’ as an 
umbrella term. Yet this term is broad and ambiguous, encompassing as it does a huge diversity of 
approaches and concepts with vastly different implications. For these reasons, Dale Jamieson (2013) 
argues that geoengineering ‘does not mark a specific category of response to climate change but 
simply alerts us to the fact that the approach under discussion is viewed by the speaker as novel, 
weird, exotic, unfamiliar, or untested’ (529). There is also increasing recognition that the issues faced 
by GGR may in fact be quite different from those faced by SRM and that the two should therefore be 
disentangled (Cox et al. 2018; Heyward 2013). Different approaches may also entail different forms 
of sociotechnical governance. Ocean fertilisation provides one example of this, with deployment 
being prohibited under international law because of the unbounded and unpredictable nature of its 
effects. There is value, therefore, in focusing the enquiry by looking at discourses on a set of specific 
GGR proposals. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
1.2 Methods 
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This study forms the initial part of a larger, ongoing project on attitudes toward GGR, with a 
particular focus on three novel ‘engineered’ GGRs envisaged for deployment at significant scale: 
Direct Air Capture, Enhanced Rock Weathering and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(BECCS). We focus on these three proposals because, at present, these appear to be the three with the 
greatest long-term CO2 sequestration potential (see Minx et al. 2018, Fig. 6), and thus represent 
important considerations for decision makers. For this initial stage of the project, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with seventeen informed stakeholders, with the aim of exploring what factors 
and underlying discourses currently shape their perceptions. Appraisals of technically advanced 
climate strategies can suffer from a tendency to ‘close down’ around narrow problem definitions (see 
Bellamy et al. 2013); we aim to overcome this by setting up a semi-structured format in which the 
interviewee is largely allowed to determine the direction of the conversation, thereby opening up to a 
wider diversity of framings. As such, the results should not be considered ‘representative’ of the full 
opinions of any individual participant – or the body of participants as a whole – but rather as offering 
in-depth insight into some of the more complex and nuanced aspects of this topic. Despite focusing 
initially on specific GGR proposals, the semi-structured methodology meant that participants often 
volunteered their own understandings of ‘GGR’ – for instance, by discussing other proposals or by 
talking more generally about the concept of removing GHGs from the atmosphere. 
For brevity, we henceforth refer to our participants as ‘experts’. However, it is worth noting 
that terms such as ‘experts’ and ‘informed stakeholders’ are complex, and there is no agreed 
definition of what constitutes an ‘expert’ (Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007). Expertise takes many forms, 
and some of our participants were selected for their broader knowledge of related fields as opposed to 
specific expertise on the any of the three GGR proposals. Accordingly, it is important to avoid 
fetishising ‘expert’ knowledge, as this may not be any more valid or insightful than that of people 
approaching the topic of GGR for the very first time. We therefore conceptualise our ‘experts’ more 
as a representation of a particular ‘type’ of public (or rather, several types, considering their range of 
expertise) who seemed likely to have some interesting pre-existing opinions on GGR.1  
Our selection of interviewees was designed to elicit a broad range of expertise. We first 
identified a set of five relevant sectors that we thought would give us a range of perspectives: 
academia (physical sciences, engineering); academia (social sciences, law); policy and regulation; 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and the industrial/private sector. Previous work has shown 
that the sector in which people work has an influence on their perspectives (Allison 1969); a sectoral 
 
1 Later in the project, the results of this study will be used for triangulation with results from workshops with lay publics 
wherein we expect much lower (possibly non-existent) levels of pre-existing knowledge.  
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approach like ours is thus one way of targeting and accessing a broader spectrum of views. Within 
these sectors and specialisms, our respondents were selected on the basis of purposive sampling, 
wherein we first contacted people who we were aware would have pre-existing knowledge and 
opinions on GGR, either because of their job role or because of their public or research profile. In 
some cases, we failed to attract a response from the desired individual, and therefore decided to use 
snowball sampling by asking participants to suggest additional people. This combination of 
purposive and snowball sampling is suitable for instances where the researchers have knowledge of 
the individuals working within the field, and for studies aiming toward depth and nuance rather than 
statistical representativeness.  
Table 2 details the sector and subject area of each of our participants. To uphold 
confidentiality, we avoid providing identifying information and, for the results section, we have 
assigned random alphabetical aliases which do not correspond with any characteristics of the 
participants. The table shows that the majority of interviewees were academics; this is partly due to a 
higher rate of response, and partly a reflection of the early stage of GGR development, which means 
that there are relatively few individuals in other sectors who we felt would have pre-existing 
knowledge. The people we interviewed were all from the UK and US, although they all work for 
international organisations or conduct international research. The topic of GGR has a global aspect, 
because many research efforts stem from the context of global science/policy on climate change, and 
our participants’ expertise was generally global enough that informed discussion was had without 
deference to geographical context. That said, practices of GGR and their discourses are 
geographically rooted and tend to be embedded in local contexts, a factor which is important to take 
into account when interpreting the results. We found that discussions on policy and governance, for 
instance, tended to be place-specific and were primarily rooted in a western context.  
 Interview transcripts were analysed using recognised methods for thematic coding analysis 
(see Braun and Clarke 2006), using N-Vivo software. We began by listening carefully through the 
interview recordings many times, to become familiar with the data and to inductively draw out key 
‘themes’ that were prevalent in and across the interviews. In the tradition of narrative analysis, our 
focus was very much on the content of what was said (as opposed to, say, discourse analysis where 
the focus is on how it is said), following methods for upstream elicitation described by Phil 
Macnaghten and Greg Myers (2004). In this paper, we focus on two key themes which emerged 
consistently as the focus of interview discussions – ‘risk’ and ‘responsibility’. We also look at the 
‘role of the public’, a theme that was deliberately introduced via direct questioning from us for 
triangulation with the results from our non-expert study later on. The following section addresses 
each of these themes in turn, presenting what was said by our participants in a descriptive manner. 
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Section 4 then analyses the deeper content of these responses, looking at why our participants might 
have responded in this way and what this might tell us about deeper narratives on novel GGRs.  
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
2. RESULTS 
2.1 Risk 
‘Risks’ or ‘concerns’ around GGRs emerged, as anticipated, as one of the central themes of our 
coding analysis. Yet one of the striking things was the sheer diversity of risks mentioned, and the 
diversity of conceptual approaches used to discuss various risks. For every new interviewee we spoke 
to, a different range of concerns emerged; importantly, however, this was not necessarily aligned 
with people’s disciplines. For example, some of the participants with expertise in physics or 
modelling showed themselves to be interested in (and adept at) discussing social and ethical issues. 
Broadly, it is possible to differentiate between three types of risk among those mentioned: 
physical/environmental (e.g. land-use requirements, ecosystem impacts), techno-economic (e.g. high 
capital costs, lack of technology readiness) and social (e.g. acceptability, equity, health). For Direct 
Air Capture and Enhanced Weathering, techno-economic and environmental risks were 
overwhelmingly mentioned first and most explicitly, whereas social risks were mentioned more 
implicitly and much later in the conversation (if at all). However, when discussing Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), no such pattern emerged – social risks were mentioned just as 
frequently as environmental ones. We hypothesise that this could be because of the relative state of 
knowledge about unintended social consequences, many of which have become apparent with the 
development of a large-scale biomass industry. Unintended social consequences are notoriously 
difficult to envisage, so social risks for more novel GGRs are perhaps under-discussed precisely 
because we haven’t yet experienced them. For bioenergy on the other hand, it has become apparent 
that the social and physical risks are actually tightly interconnected: for example, impacts on 
ecosystem services constitute both an environmental and a social risk. 
One of the most common ‘risk’ topics discussed was the concern that investing or 
even believing in the prospect of negative emissions at scale might reduce incentives to 
pursue steep emissions reductions – termed ‘mitigation deterrence’ by the GGR research team 
at Lancaster University (see Markusson et al. 2018). The risk of mitigation deterrence was 
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portrayed, not just as a question of policy, but also as a question of narratives – or, in the words of 
one participant, ‘the stories we tell ourselves’: 
 
So, a negative emission technology operating out of a field in Bedfordshire 
justifies the continued exploitation of the North Sea and fracking, because 
of the stories we tell ourselves, ‘It’s all okay because we’ve now got this 
way of dealing with the emissions as a consequence’. (Participant O) 
 
Unsurprisingly, there was generally consensus that conventional mitigation (in the sense of low-
carbon supply or energy demand reduction) should come first and foremost, and that GGR should be 
thought of as ‘a potential addition’ and ‘in no way a substitute’, with ‘a larger role for demand 
reduction and more renewables’ (participants B and P).2 Yet many people also recommended GGR 
for maintaining a diverse portfolio of measures, whilst acknowledging that tough choices must be 
made regarding what this portfolio might look like and the trade-offs therein. In the words of 
participant G: ‘I don’t think any one of the proposed solutions so far is a magic bullet. We are 
looking at a blend of different solutions. I just think, we need to get on with it’. Most participants 
rejected the idea of a binary choice between mitigation and GGR, while at the same time warning of 
mitigation deterrence and opportunity cost; clearly, a difficult task remains in deciding what sort of 
portfolio of measures should exist, and who gets to decide what this should look like.  
It would be remiss to discuss perceptions of risk without also discussing potential benefits, the 
most commonly mentioned of which was the possibility that GGR will become necessary to avoid 
dangerous climate change. This topic in many ways illustrates the diversity of responses: opinions 
ranged from ‘GGRs are vital’ to ‘GGRs are dangerous’, and everything in between. The following 
remark by participant C is a good example of the ‘necessity’ discourse: 
 
But we have absolutely no chance of getting there [to global net zero 
emissions] without carbon dioxide removal, there’s no question about that. 
If you run the models on the back of an envelope, you don’t need a 
computer, we’re just not ever going to get there.  
 
2
 It is worth reiterating that the mitigation scenarios used to inform policy-makers do not portray GGR as an ‘addition’; 
rather, in the vast majority of models, large-scale GGR development is critical to meeting the minimum 2°C reduction 
target. 
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This stance is tightly connected to a prevalent discourse of urgency, evident in assertions such as ‘we 
just need to get on with it’. Yet many participants argued that the modelling assumptions that led us 
to these conclusions need to be examined more critically. The assumption that GGR will be 
‘necessary’ to avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change is clearly a strongly framed statement that is 
somewhat reliant on trust in the IPCC IAM scenarios – trust which may be wavering amongst the 
scientific community owing to concerns over the transparency of GGR assumptions in these models. 
This uncertainty resulted in a complex and sometimes ambivalent discourse emerging across the 
interviews regarding deference to global climate targets and institutions as well as the role of experts 
in tackling climate change. Several participants critiqued the process of target setting and the 
emergence of the ‘necessity’ discourse as having taken place within a very top-down, undemocratic 
system; yet many acknowledged that international agreements – and the science to back them up – 
may be required to deal with the problem of climate change. One comment from participant L 
illustrates the two sides of this discourse, in which some participants fell squarely in the middle: 
 
So, I’m a degree sceptical about, in the bigger picture, these targets take on 
too big a role in shaping and guiding and directing, not just discursively, 
but actual real investments. Having said that, this is the political process 
we’re in and we’ve been in it for thirty years around climate change, and 
international negotiations and target setting is not going to disappear 
anytime soon. 
 
2.1 Responsibility 
Although not always mentioned explicitly, responsibility was a prevalent underlying topic during 
these interviews. Responsibility can of course mean many things: responsibility for emissions 
reductions; responsibility to develop and pay for GGRs; responsibility to govern and safeguard 
against risks of various kinds; responsibility to pursue equity, justice and democracy. Many of the 
semi-structured discussions drifted quickly onto the topic of ‘who decides’ on a desirable emissions 
target and how best to go about achieving it, a clear corollary to the discussion about deference to 
climate targets. Very frequently, points were made regarding how ‘we’ or ‘society’ needs to make 
decisions, as illustrated by this quote from participant D:  
 
11 
 
And so, we have to make some hard choices at this point, and we need 
some tools in determining what those trade-offs are and how we as a 
society determine how we make those trade-offs.  
 
This raises questions regarding what was meant by words such as ‘we’ and ‘society’. Several 
participants mentioned the topic of democracy and collective decision-making, yet sometimes went 
on to focus mainly on the role of experts and policy-makers; in fact, for most participants, the subtext 
of ‘responsibility’ seemed to lie mostly with experts, policy-makers and high-emitting industries. 
Alongside this, however, the interviews demonstrated a rather fundamental lack of trust in policy-
making and private sector institutions. For example, participant B commented: ‘I think the answer 
has to lie with the politicians, which I wouldn’t like to leave too many decisions to them’. Participant 
N neatly sums up the nuanced way in which this lack of trust is not necessarily based on the 
untrustworthiness of any particular institution or individual: ‘We’re not talking about conspiracies 
here, we’re talking about the way incentives align, the way incentives are reformulated as a result of 
the co-development of new technologies’.  
Our interviewees were similarly cautious about the role of researchers and technology 
developers, voicing wariness about ‘advocates who see all the benefits’ (participant P) and 
‘passionate scientists who have a very clear bias’ (participant M). The private sector was also 
revealed as a major source of mistrust: ‘I think we’re all of us now rightly suspicious of the motives 
of large, multinational corporations’ (participant C). Fundamental ambivalence was revealed about 
the role of the private sector in research and development for GGR, with participants lacking trust in 
the intentions of the private sector and in the objectivity of privately funded trials. Concerns about the 
full reporting of negative results were raised by several people, and multiple participants referred to 
past controversies over private sector involvement – particularly the Monsanto company – in 
genetically modified (GM) crop development (more on which in section 4). Yet, simultaneously, 
participants acknowledged that the resources held by the private sector may be required for capital-
intensive research and technology development. For example, participant D said: ‘I would have some 
enhanced concerns if this were being driven by a profit motive, while simultaneously acknowledging 
that that might be the only way that it actually happens’. Private capital will never have altruistic 
motives, but at the same time it was argued by many that working with powerful institutions is more 
pragmatic than working against them. This essentially comes down to a question of whether the ends 
justify the means: ‘Social responsibility versus vested interest is a fine line, perhaps, but there we go’ 
(participant G).  
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Related to the theme of responsibility was what we might call the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
Participants suggested that, by working within incumbent systems, it could be possible to create 
climate strategies that are paid for by those responsible for the problem in the first place, i.e. the 
world’s highest emitters. Many mentioned the idea of a tax or levy on emissions, which could be 
used to pay for GGR research or incentives. This was popular both for reasons of both fairness and 
pragmatism. ‘It’d be quite good to turn the fossil industry around and say, “Now fix the problem you 
created”’, remarked participant H, but also: ‘If we get away from fossil fuels but somehow, we don’t 
put everyone out of business … we just turn them round and do something else with it’. Participant K 
suggested that having GGR options (particularly Direct Air Capture) on the table could actually help 
to shift the burden of responsibility: 
 
Having a technology that could remove CO2 from the atmosphere changes 
the whole moral situation. At the moment, an emitter of CO2 can say, 
‘Well, we would clear it up if we could, but there’s no technology that can 
do it, so we can’t.’ Once there is a technology that can do it, it’s no longer, 
‘We can’t do it’, it’s, ‘We don’t want to do it.’ And that creates a very 
different moral situation. It enables people to say, ‘Well, you should clean 
it up because you can’.  
 
However, among many of the participants, there was also a strong feeling that an incumbent system 
would tend to benefit historical winners. Some participants even saw GGR as presenting an ‘opt-out’ 
for those responsible for causing the problem in the first place – an issue that is closely connected to 
the narratives of necessity and mitigation deterrence discussed previously. For participant Q, for 
example:  
 
Governments and politicians and others are signing up to saying, ‘We’re 
going to aim to get as close to 1.5˚ as we can or well below 2˚.’ And yet, 
on the same hand, at the same time, knowing full well they’re not actually 
decarbonising their own economies very far. 
 
Several participants also pointed out that perspectives on GGR may be very different in the Global 
South where, as participant Q notes: 
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There’s a great deal of scepticism around negative emissions… many of 
those countries have been at the front end of western countries’ dash for 
biofuels; it’s their forests that have been bought up by overseas companies 
and people driven off, or the oil palm rush, or the rush to produce soya to 
feed our cattle so we can have massive Big Macs. 
 
The ethics of international carbon accounting is complex and often fails to recognise the equity and 
justice considerations of implementing GGR in developing countries. For example, there was 
widespread consensus amongst participants that implementing BECCS at scale would probably result 
in some extremely unjust outcomes, potentially penalising vulnerable communities for the past and/or 
present actions of the world’s wealthy and powerful. As Participant A said: ‘it’s bloody suspicious 
how often the settings in which these things are best experimented with happen to be the settings 
where they’re least resisted’.  
 
2.2 The role of the public 
At the end of our interviews, the participants were asked directly about their thoughts on the role of 
the public (or, as stressed by many, the role of various publics) in GGR development and 
deployment. It is interesting that, despite the prevalence of topics of responsibility and power across 
almost all interviews, the role of non-experts did not tend to arise until the question was asked 
explicitly at the end of the interview.  
 Several participants conceptualised the role of the public in terms of policy and decision-
makers, stating for example that: ‘the primary role of the public is to motivate their politicians’ (C) 
and that, ‘if you’re not involving members of the public in this decision, you’re missing important 
evidence upon which to base your decisions’ (B). Similarly, several suggested that the role of the 
public should be to provide checks and balances to the experts and proponents of GGR about whom 
distrust was voiced previously: ‘I think sometimes when we say ‘expert’, we mean someone who’s 
already got the blinkers on’ (H). This response itself reveals some reflexivity around the role of 
experts, as this interviewee presumably recognises that they are themselves considered an ‘expert’. 
However, some participants argued that the role of the public is more fundamental, and should take 
place earlier in the process, setting the very framing of the questions around these proposals: ‘It’s not 
so much how should society be involved in this question, it’s more what questions does society want 
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to ask?’ (A). This sentiment was also voiced alongside a mistrust of the kinds of consultation 
exercises often employed, in which the publics’ answers are essentially pre-determined by the nature 
of the questions being asked. Again, several participants referred to the GM controversy; yet, in an 
interesting echo of that debate, there were plenty of participants at the other end of the spectrum who 
saw it as important that the public be informed about and consulted on the risks and benefits of 
technologies that have already been developed. For example: 
 
Like any of these production routes, technologies and things like that, 
you’ve got to get some level of acceptance … Ultimately consumers, the 
populace have got to feel assured that what’s happening is good … 
certainly not bad, anyway. (E) 
 
You need to convince the public that there is some value in these bioenergy 
crops without detracting from food production, from the value of your 
agricultural lands. (I) 
 
The range of responses we identified here was almost entirely aligned with the continuum of 
responses discussed in the previous section regarding the relative ‘necessity’ of novel GGR 
proposals. Participants who envisaged a more agenda-setting role for the public tended to be more 
sceptical, highlighting concerns about justice, democracy and social and environmental risks. 
Meanwhile, those who envisaged a more consultative role for the public tended to advocate more for 
GGR, often envisaging its necessity or even inevitability in the years ahead. As such, we found that 
the responses were not necessarily aligned with participants’ discipline or area of expertise. 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
3.1 Incumbency  
As suggested in the preceding section, much of the underlying discourse and debate over GGR is 
related to perceptions of incumbency. Although there was much diversity in our participants’ 
attitudes to GGR, attitudes seemed to coalesce around whether or not they felt that climate strategies 
should aim to work within existing incumbent capitalist systems. There is a question here over 
whether the primary concern is climate change or the fossil fuel industry, or even capitalism itself; 
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currently, these tend to be aligned in climate discourse but, if solutions to climate change actually 
come from within the industry – for instance, by financing GGR through the polluter pays principle – 
then this discourse becomes contradictory. An interesting corollary to this can be found in work 
showing that geoengineering solutions may actually be popular with climate sceptics as it seems to 
align better with ‘individualist’ and ‘hierarchical’ worldviews than conventional climate change 
approaches, which mainly appeal to ‘egalitarian’ worldviews. In this way, debates around GGR find 
similarity with earlier debates on sustainable development and ecological modernisation: in both 
cases, proponents of incumbent systems argue that a sustainable transition is possible by shifting 
existing industrial society toward a more ecologically focused mode of production, whereas ‘deep 
green’ advocates argue for radical transformation away from the capitalist focus on economic growth 
(see Dryzek 1997). Applying this to the new debate on technological solutions to climate change and 
the role of climate models, Michael Keary (2016) argues for an approach that ‘would not stake the 
earth on future technological improvements’ (24). This is linked to the topic of mitigation deterrence 
because GGR is seen by many as a potential opt-out, allowing incumbents to avoid taking difficult 
decisions or actions on climate change. 
 Within the ‘necessity’ discourse, radical emissions reductions are seen as being simply too 
difficult, implying that GGR is needed to avert dangerous climate change. Yet this discourse was 
critiqued and even rejected by many of our participants on the grounds that there is a difference 
between a technical and a political challenge. The counter-discourse argues that radical emissions 
reductions are portrayed as being ‘too difficult’ by incumbent interests who wish to protect the status 
quo. Importantly, this suggests that Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) may provide a useful 
analogue for thinking about GGR risk and responsibility (see Markusson et al. 2017). Experts’ 
perceptions of CCS have been researched in more depth than GGR, and there is some evidence that 
CCS may prompt some of the same social and ethical concerns, such as path dependency and 
mitigation deterrence (Hansson and Bryngelsson 2009; Markusson and Haszeldine 2009). The 
‘necessity’ discourse is also found to be quite strong amongst experts discussing CCS, wherein 
tackling climate change is seen as being too great a challenge without it.  
However, we also noticed a major point of departure: depending on the study, experts’ 
perceptions of CCS often focus on barriers to implementation – in other words, whether we actually 
could implement CCS – whereas the results from our GGR interviews show a crucial ethical and 
normative element – that is, whether we should implement GGR. This is interesting because many 
GGR proposals necessarily incorporate CCS technology, thus raising the question of whether there is 
anything particular about negative emissions (as opposed to emissions reduction) that makes it more 
ethically problematic. Exploration of the particular characteristics of GGR and CCS shows that 
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ethical differences between them are in fact extremely blurred. Therefore, we suggest that perhaps 
the very concept of removing GHGs from the atmosphere gives a stronger implication that mankind 
has failed to adequately challenge unsustainable system dynamics.  
In many ways, the ambivalence around certain topics in the preceding section (e.g. the role of 
climate models and the private sector) is symptomatic of the ambivalence experienced by participants 
about working within incumbent systems and institutions. Our interviews showed that stakeholders 
do not necessarily fall into two separate camps, and often even experience ambivalence regarding 
their own stance. In other words, there is a deep debate occurring – not only between separate people, 
but within the minds of individuals themselves – over whether technological solutions represent a 
pragmatic strategy in the face of incumbent system inertia, or whether they simply fail to adequately 
address unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. Unlike Gannon and Hulme (2018), 
whose Q-sort study identified a fairly polarised discourse surrounding ocean fertilisation, our 
interviews revealed that both ‘advocacy’ and ‘critical’ discourses (see Anshelm and Hansson 2014) 
were frequently present within the same stakeholder. Perspectives are thus non-binary, and although 
there may be outspoken proponents toward each end of the continuum, most of our participants spoke 
to multiple places on the continuum simultaneously. Cairns and Stirling (2014) find similar nuance in 
their study, which they relate to the ambiguity of the term ‘geoengineering’, yet in our interviews, 
this ambiguity emerged despite discussing three specific GGRs, suggesting that it may go beyond 
definitional questions, terminological clarity or lack thereof. 
 This debate is connected to the wider discussion of whether GGR is ‘restorative’ or ‘additive’ 
(Preston 2015); the suspicion over incumbent systems in many ways reflects a deep unease about the 
concept of GGR as ‘restorative’ because net anthropogenic forcing is not really seen as being the 
‘root cause’ of climate change. Yet there is tension here with the mitigation deterrence discourse, 
which might explain some of the ambivalence. There is widespread agreement (both in our 
interviews and in the surrounding policy and academic literature) that conventional mitigation 
options such as renewables must take precedence in order to avoid mitigation deterrence; yet large-
scale commercial renewables do not really challenge the incumbent system either. Again, the 
heightened levels of concern about GGR suggest that the concept of removing GHGs creates an 
impression of failure to challenge unsustainable system dynamics.  
 
3.2 ‘The Monsanto effect’  
It might seem odd to name a paper after a company which, to our knowledge, has little or no 
involvement in GGR. Yet the Monsanto company was mentioned unprompted by a surprising 
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number of our participants, and their role in GM crop development may provide an interesting 
example of and lens on the themes of trust and incumbency discussed throughout this paper. The GM 
controversy offers important lessons for novel technology development in that it acted as an 
illustration of the importance of extensive upstream public engagement: by the time decision makers 
read the results of early engagement work, a major public controversy had erupted, with NGOs and 
some media platforms taking strong anti-GM stances (Grove-White et al. 2000). As a major producer 
of GM crops, Monsanto became synonymous not only with distrust over the crops themselves but the 
entire incumbent agro-industrial system. We call this the ‘Monsanto effect’, whereby one company’s 
involvement in an entirely separate debate (in this case, GM food) taps into deeper narratives and 
becomes so pervasive that it spills over into a new debate – in this case, GGR.  
This analogy could, in theory, be generalised to multiple other topics, not least because this 
narrative isn’t really about Monsanto per se. Monsanto simply represents the incumbent system over 
which there is a lack of trust and a perception of ‘misaligned responsibility’ – in other words, 
responsibility for profit motives rather than for the good of society or the environment. Indeed, the 
results from our interviews were interesting because they revealed a rather fundamental lack of trust 
in many institutions, particularly those in and of the private sector. This distrust reflects debates 
around the role of GGRs (particularly BECCS) in IAM scenarios (Anderson and Peters 2016; 
Vaughan and Gough 2016). Again, the misgivings revealed something deeper than distrust in the 
modelling process per se; rather, the concern was that the very questions being asked in the scientific 
community are defined by a small group of elites, without participation from those who might be 
most affected by the outcomes. In a similar vein, Keary (2016) argues that climate models employ 
technological optimism in order to show us that sustainability and economic growth are compatible, 
while marginalising discourses that might contradict this. McLaren (2016) suggests that this type of 
framing actually benefits GGR over SRM because GGR may be more compatible with a neoliberal 
ideology, wherein climate change can supposedly be tackled using technology and carbon markets, 
whereas SRM represents a far more disruptive challenge to incumbent systems. The ‘promise’ of 
GGRs in climate models thus permits the idea of continuing with the existing regime without having 
to change it much (Markusson et al. 2018). In this sense, the ambivalence revealed by our 
stakeholders is reflective of discussions in the literature on climate change, particularly around the 
notion of ‘epistemic justice’ in climate decision-making: that is, concern about the ways in which 
society interprets a particular phenomenon or tackles a particular question (Mabon and Shackley 
2015). Thus, even if fair procedures are in place, viewpoints may be marginalised by the way an 
entire societal discourse treats a question or problem; for example, processes of framing and agenda-
setting can determine which knowledge (and whose voices) are rendered admissible (Blue 2015). By 
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seeking a ‘global knowledge consensus’ (for instance, through deference to global IAMs), climate 
change discourse increasingly allows only the most powerful to determine what forms of knowledge 
are valid, rather than attending to the diversity of cultures and values that generate a diversity of 
forms of knowledge (Hulme 2010).  
These issues of trust mean that more diverse publics need to be involved in decision-making, 
not just over when or where a technology is implemented, but over the emerging discourse around 
that technology and the questions that are asked. Amongst our experts, those who envisaged a more 
active and agenda-setting role for non-experts tended to be more sceptical of GGR, whereas those 
who outlined a more consultative role tended to be much more advocative. This has important 
implications for the way in which GGR support mechanisms are designed and appraised, since 
advocates might be less predisposed to get broader peer communities or publics involved – and yet 
the literature on public engagement (plus decades of experience) shows us why this might be a 
mistake (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1995; Grove-White et al. 2000). Equally, we need to be reflective 
about the motives of those sceptical of GGR who propose a broader role for non-experts: it may be 
that non-experts are seen as a mechanism by which GGR proposals can be slowed or halted yet, in 
the current absence of empirical research on public perceptions of these proposals, we cannot simply 
assume that they will play this role.  
 
3.3 Limitations and areas for further research 
It was interesting to note the diversity of viewpoints that emerged from our interviewees. This was 
partly a reflection of the broad range of opinions we sought to elicit, however, and the fact that – 
owing to constraints on time and resources – it was only possible to interview seventeen people in 
total. Interviewing more might have given us a better idea of the extent of viewpoint diversity and the 
degree of alignment with participants’ sectors and disciplines. Further, our purposive/snowball 
sampling methodology, whilst widely recognised in the literature on expert elicitation, may have 
biased our findings due to our subjective targeting of participants. Upon reflection, it would also have 
been useful to interview people from a larger geographical range, including experts from the Global 
South; although many of our experts voiced with some authority the views of their global 
organisations and/or partners in Global South areas, their perspectives will still have been rooted in 
their local or national contexts and experiences (Gannon and Hulme 2018). 
The interview results were also limited by the time allotted to each session: in recognition of 
our participants’ busy schedules, we aimed to keep interviews to around one hour each, and there was 
not always time within the hour to discuss individual GGR proposals in much detail. Our 
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methodology deliberately sought to allow interviewees to determine the direction of the conversation, 
with some focusing more on specific technologies and some discussing the concept more generally. 
However, more time could have been devoted to probing perspectives on BECCS, in particular; for 
example, exploring in more depth the differences in the types of risk discussed for BECCS as 
opposed to other GGR proposals (see section 3.1). Nevertheless, our results suggest that there may be 
something rather fundamental about the way in which these three novel GGRs are envisaged and the 
way in which they interact with incumbent systems, which is useful to explore as a separate 
discussion from technology-specific risks.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has contributed to a growing body of research on Greenhouse Gas Removal for climate 
change mitigation, exploring stakeholder discourses on three GGR proposals (BECCS, Direct Air 
Capture and Enhanced Weathering), with a particular focus on the role of these GGRs in future social 
and political systems. Conceptualising ‘informed stakeholders’ as a certain type of public whose 
perspectives are shaped by assumptions and subjectivities just like other publics, we have argued that 
it is important to engage with such stakeholders whilst remembering that their knowledge should not 
necessarily be prioritised over other forms or sources of knowledge. We found considerable diversity 
in opinion amongst our interviewees, with new perspectives emerging with each new person we 
spoke to and only partial alignment with their specific discipline or sector. From these interviews, we 
have suggested that CCS can provide a useful analogue for thinking about GGR risk and 
responsibility; however, we note that expert perspectives on CCS tend to focus on a techno-economic 
narrative of whether we could implement such systems, whereas these GGRs seem to raise more 
ethical and normative narratives of whether we should. The underlying sentiments of our participants 
suggested that this may be because the concept of negative emissions gives a stronger implication 
that mankind has failed to adequately challenge unsustainable system dynamics.  
Ambivalence emerged about the role of the private sector across the interviews, with 
participants lacking trust in private companies’ motives yet simultaneously acknowledging that their 
resources may be required. We noticed that the Monsanto company was mentioned by numerous 
interviewees, despite the fact that they have no current involvement in GGR, which we suggest is an 
effect of the ways in which Monsanto became synonymous with incumbency, distrust and misaligned 
responsibility during the GM debate. Consequently, we presented the idea of a ‘Monsanto effect’, 
whereby any organisation’s involvement in a separate debate taps into deeper narratives and becomes 
so pervasive that it spills over into an entirely new debate. This effect is illustrative of the way in 
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which perspectives on GGR seem to be rooted in deep-seated values regarding trust and the role of 
incumbent systems and interests. GGR appears to be symptomatic of a deep debate, sometimes 
within the minds of individuals themselves, over whether technological solutions represent a 
pragmatic strategy in the face of incumbent system inertia, or whether they simply fail to adequately 
address unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. We thus highlight a particular 
psychological challenge facing high-tech GGR in that actors may themselves feel conflicted about its 
desirability. This has significant implications for climate policy, as it suggests that some novel GGRs 
might lack the kind of support that may be necessary for timely, large-scale deployment. In other 
words, GGR appears to be failing to garner support that is simultaneously broad (i.e. from a spectrum 
of actors including policy-makers, NGOs and intermediaries) and deep, in that it aligns with actors’ 
values. 
The topics covered in this paper are essentially about four forms of justice: distributive, 
restorative, procedural and epistemic. Our participants’ ambivalence about the role of the private 
sector, and their concerns about the impact of GGR on land requirements and communities in the 
Global South, are questions of distributive justice: who gets the burden of and who benefits from 
climate change mitigation? Meanwhile, the topic of responsibility raises questions of restorative 
justice: to what extent will those causing the problem be held responsible for dealing with it? Debates 
around climate targets and the role of the public involve questions of procedural justice: who gets to 
decide whether GGRs are ‘necessary’? Each of these topics emerged from our analysis, not as 
discrete headings, but as a tightly interconnected web of overlapping concerns, rooted in deep-seated 
values regarding the role of incumbent systems and interests and in underlying concerns about the 
degree to which epistemic justice is maintained in current approaches to developing and assessing 
climate policy. We thus conclude by recommending that greater attention is paid to the roles of 
justice and incumbency in the development and deployment of GGR proposals. It can be difficult to 
be reflexive about the influence of a powerful incumbent narrative when, to some extent, all experts 
(including the authors of this paper) exist within it; yet, perhaps greater focus on the justice questions 
raised here can help to provide a counter-balance to the incumbent narrative that speaks of ‘necessity’ 
to deploy GGRs at scale. For example, we agree with some of our participants that there needs to be a 
measured discussion about the primacy of carbon targets in climate strategy, lest we risk drifting 
toward solutions which may create some of the impacts we are trying to avoid. We also recommend 
that future work continue to build on the efforts of previous research to ‘open up’ the appraisal of 
novel technologies to different publics and different framings and definitions of the problem (see for 
example Bellamy et al. 2013; Bellamy and Lezaun 2017; Pidgeon et al. 2017). Crucially, this means 
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improving the mechanisms by which diverse perspectives can contribute towards the co-creation of 
knowledge, decision-making and responsible technology development. 
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Table 1: Some major GGR proposals (adapted from Olsen 2011). 
Method Description Tech readiness Concerns 
Afforestatio
n / 
reforestatio
n 
Planting trees or 
reforesting previously 
deforested areas 
Already widely 
implemented 
• Land-use conflicts between 
reforestation and agriculture 
• Carbon stored in vegetation can 
easily be released by fire, drought or 
deforestation 
Soil Carbon 
Sequestratio
n (SCS) 
Changing land 
management and farming 
practices to increase the 
carbon content of soil  
Ready for 
implementation 
• Soils eventually reach saturation  
• Vulnerable to disturbance (e.g. later 
land-use changes) 
• May increase release of other 
greenhouse gases from soil 
Wetland 
restoration 
Restoring or constructing 
carbon-dense ecosystems 
such as wetlands, 
peatlands and coastal 
ecosystems.  
Already being 
implemented at 
small scale 
• Increased production of non-CO2 
gases such as methane 
• Relatively limited global 
sequestration potential 
• Competition for land 
Bioenergy 
with Carbon 
Capture and 
Sequestratio
n (BECCS) 
Biomass used as fuel for 
electricity generation or 
hydrogen production, 
with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) of the 
resulting CO2. 
All components 
ready but not yet 
being used at 
scale. CCS 
deployment 
experiencing 
delays. 
• Fuel vs. food: incentive for biomass 
production can reduce the availability 
and increase the cost of food crops 
• Environmental impacts of intensive 
growing 
• Availability and safety of 
sequestration sites 
Biochar Agricultural and forestry 
wastes burned through 
pyrolysis to produce 
biochar (charcoal), which 
is sequestered in the soil. 
Well understood 
but not yet widely 
implemented due 
to lack of 
pyrolysis 
facilities.  
• Supply of biomass wastes 
• Long-term impacts of high biochar 
applications not yet known 
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Terrestrial 
Enhanced 
Weathering 
(EW) 
Rock weathering 
processes accelerated by 
finely crushing and 
spreading rocks. Rocks 
weather to produce 
carbonates, which sink 
into the deep ocean, 
sequestering the carbon 
they contain. 
Could technically 
be implemented 
now, but not 
economically 
feasible. Field 
trial research into 
ecosystem 
impacts is 
ongoing.  
• Requires mining, processing and 
transportation of large quantities of 
crushed rock, with high energy use 
and costs 
• Uncertainties about impacts on soil 
pH and vegetation 
• Possible leaching of heavy metals 
into soils and crops 
Direct Air 
Capture 
(DAC) 
Industrial processes to 
extract CO2 from 
ambient air, with capture 
and storage (CCS) of the 
CO2 . 
Mainly at 
laboratory stage.  
CCS deployment 
experiencing 
delays.  
• Technically feasible, but not clear if 
cost effective 
processes can be developed  
• Requires large amounts of energy to 
power the DAC units  
• Availability and safety of 
sequestration sites 
Ocean 
Fertilisation 
Adding iron, nitrogen or 
phosphates to ocean 
water as nutrients to 
stimulate the growth of 
phytoplankton that 
absorb CO2 during 
photosynthesis.  
Research stage. 
Deployment 
prohibited under 
the London 
Convention. 
• Potential disruption of the ocean 
carbon system 
• Not as effective as hoped for 
removing carbon 
• Generally viewed as extremely high-
risk 
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Table 2: Details of interviewees 
Alias Sector Subject area 
A Academia Social sciences 
B Academia Social sciences 
C Academia Physical sciences 
D Policy / regulation Law & social science 
E Private sector Physical sciences 
F Academia Engineering 
G Academia Physical sciences 
H Academia / policy Physical sciences 
I Academia Physical sciences 
J Academia Physical sciences 
K Private sector Policy 
L Academia Social sciences 
M NGO Law & policy 
N Academia Social sciences 
O NGO Policy 
P Policy / regulation Policy 
Q NGO Policy & social science 
 
